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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Wilson appeals contending the district court abused its discretion by admitting
portions of two exhibits under I.R.E. 404(b) and 609. Specifically, he asserts that the risk of
undue prejudice of that evidence, which revealed that he was convicted felon, substantially
outweighed the minimal probative value that evidence had. Mr. Wilson also contends the district
court abused its discretion when it initially imposed his sentence and when it denied his motion
for leniency.
The majority of the State’s arguments in response to those issues are unremarkable.
However, there are two which require further reply. First, on the issue about the evidence of
Mr. Wilson’s prior conviction, the State failed to argue half of the relevant standard for harmless
error. As such, the State failed to carry its burden in that regard. Second, on the motion for
leniency, the State’s main argument is based on what the State would have preferred the district
court had done, rather than considering what the district court, based on its express words,
actually did. As such, this Court should reject the State’s arguments in that regard.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Wilson’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that Mr. Wilson was a
convicted felon?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence on
Mr. Wilson and by denying his motion for a more lenient sentence?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Evidence That Mr. Wilson Was A
Convicted Felon
The State’s arguments on the merits of this issue—the erroneous decision to admit the
evidence revealing that Mr. Wilson was a convicted felon under I.R.E. 404(b) and 609—are not
remarkable, and as such, no further reply is necessary in regard to the merits of this issue.
Accordingly, Mr. Wilson simply refers the Court back to pages 9-17 of his Appellant’s Brief,
which makes it clear the district court erred by admitting that evidence in this case.
However, the State’s argument as to why that error was harmless requires reply because
the State’s argument in that regard ignores half of the applicable standard.
Supreme Court recently made clear:

As the Idaho

“Harmless error is ‘error unimportant in relation to

everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’” State v.
Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, ___, 462 P.3d 1125, 1138 (2020) (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391,
403 (1991), overruled on other grounds). Importantly, the Supreme Court pointed out: “Proper
application of the Yates two-part test requires weighing the probative force of the record as a
whole while excluding the erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the
probative force of the error.” Id. (emphasis added). As a result, it is only “[w]hen the effect of
the error is minimal compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’ without the error, [that] it can be said that the error did not contribute to the
verdict rendered and is therefore harmless.” Id. As such, the State must address not only the
other evidence in the record, but also the probative force of the error itself, when it invokes the
harmless error doctrine. Id.; accord State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013) (holding the
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State failed to carry its burden under the harmless error standard when it failed to actually argue
the proper standard for harmless error).
The reason the State cannot rely just on the amount of other evidence in the record
without addressing the probative force of the error itself is that doing so is to “commit the same
mistake the United States Supreme Court overturned in Chapman v. California, [386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967)]” because such an argument merely asserts that the other evidence in the record was
overwhelming. Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1139. “We reiterate that the proper showing for ‘harmless
error’ is not ‘overwhelming evidence’ of the defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 1138. Or, as the Supreme
Court put it in Almaraz:
[T]he State never specifically argues that [the erroneously-admitted evidence] did
not ‘contribute to the verdict obtained’ as clearly required under [State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209 (2010)]. For example, the subject is not even discussed in the
State’s written brief on appeal . . . . As such, the State has failed to meet its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict in this case would
have been the same even if [the erroneously-admitted evidence] had not been
admitted.
Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 598-99.
And yet, despite clear case law directly on point, the State proceeded to make the
improper overwhelming-evidence argument in Mr. Wilson’s case:

“Here, there was

overwhelming evidence of Wilson’s malice aforethought and premeditation even absent the
challenge evidence.” (Resp. Br., p.11.) The State proceeded to detail the other evidence in the
record which spoke to those elements, and concluded, “In light of this evidence and these
circumstances, the jury thus would have found the same verdict regardless of whether the
challenged evidence was admitted.” (Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) The State did not evaluate the
probative force of the error itself at any point in that argument. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.1112.) As such, the State did exactly the same thing which the United States Supreme Court held
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to be error in Chapman. See Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1139. Simply put, the State’s argument ignores
an indispensable half of the applicable test, and so, should be rejected. Id.; Almaraz, 154 Idaho
at 598-99.
Furthermore, applying the full standard recognized in Garcia, the State’s argument for
harmless error falls. As the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized, there is, in fact, a reasonable
possibility that this specific type of evidence—information that the defendant has a prior felony
conviction—will have a probative impact on the jury’s evaluation within the case as a whole.
See, e.g., State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 229 (1971); see also State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52
(2009).
Specifically, the Shepherd Court explained that the introduction of evidence that the
defendant is a convicted felon, even with a limiting instruction, carries a significant risk that “a
defendant would be prejudiced in the jury’s eyes for having committed those past crimes; and he
well may be found guilty on the basis of this past record rather than on the evidence presented
during the particular trial.”1 Shepherd, 94 Idaho at 229. That is because, when the defendant’s
prior convictions are brought up, “[e]very attorney, with even limited experience in criminal
practice, knows that impeachment of an accused in a criminal case is not, in fact, the real purpose
of the examination. It simply pictures the misconduct and villainy of the accused and prejudices
the jury by injecting hate into the proceedings.” Id. at 230 (internal quotation omitted). As the
Supreme Court has more recently put it, the introduction of this sort of character evidence “takes
1

The fact that informing the jury that the defendant has a prior felony conviction might have less
prejudicial impact than a discussion of the nature of that prior conviction, see, e.g., State v.
Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 1073 (Ct. App. 1990), does not mean the introduction of the
unexplained felony conviction has no or only a minimal probative value in the context of a
particular case. In other words, the fact that such evidence has a lesser impact than other
evidence does not mean that such evidence had a minimal impact in a particular case, which is
what Garcia requires the State to show under the harmless error standard. See Garcia, 462 P.3d
at 1139.
5

the jury away from their primary consideration of the guilt or innocence of the particular crime
on trial.” Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.
There is a reasonable possibility that the fact that Mr. Wilson had a prior conviction had a
non-minimal probative impact in the context of this case alongside the other evidence the State
elicited with respect to malice aforethought and premeditation. For example, in its closing
arguments, despite all that other evidence, the State still specifically used Mr. Wilson’s prior
conviction to help convince the jurors that Mr. Wilson had the intent to kill Ms. Brown when he
borrowed the gun, rather than to kill a sick cat or himself. (See Tr., p.586, Ls.3-13, p.587, Ls.615; Tr., p.603, L.7 - p.604, L.3.) Thus, while there may have been other evidence speaking to the
elements of malice aforethought and premeditation, the fact that Mr. Wilson was a convicted
felon was also probative to those elements. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52; Shepherd, 94 Idaho at
229. As such, the State has failed to prove that which Garcia requires it to prove—the error in
admitting that evidence harmless. Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1138 (explaining that only if the State
proves the effect of the error itself was minimal in the context of all the evidence presented in the
case can an error be said to be harmless). Therefore, the State’s argument, which failed to
address half of the applicable standard, actually failed to satisfy the State’s burden under the
proper standard. For both those reasons, this Court should reject the State’s harmless error
argument and vacate Mr. Wilson’s conviction in light of the district court’s error.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion Both In Sentencing Mr. Wilson And In
Denying His Motion For A More Lenient Sentence

A.

A Sufficient Consideration Of The Mitigating Factors Demonstrates The Initially
Imposed Sentence Fails To Serve The Goal Of Rehabilitation, And Therefore, Represents
An Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
The State’s responses concerning the initial imposition of Mr. Wilson’s sentence are not

remarkable, and as such, no further reply is necessary in regard to those issues. Accordingly,
Mr. Wilson simply refers the Court back to pages 24-29 of his Appellant’s Brief.

B.

The District Court’s Statements In Denying The Motion For Leniency Demonstrate It
Did Not Properly Understand The Legal Standards Governing Its Decision
The State did not take any issue with Mr. Wilson’s primary point with respect to his

motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35—that the district court cannot refuse to consider the new or
additional evidence the defendant presents in support of his motion for leniency. (See generally
Resp. Br., pp.17-20.) In other words, the State was essentially agreeing that the district court’s
actual statement—that “it’s not required to consider the Exhibits A through D that were
submitted” in support of the motion (Supp. Tr., p.16, Ls.1-3)—was erroneous.
The State attempts to avoid the impact of that conclusion by arguing the district court did
not actually mean what it said in that regard. (Resp. Br., p.19 (arguing that, by saying it was not
required to consider Mr. Wilson’s new or additional information, the district court was really
saying it was giving no weight to Mr. Wilson’s new or additional information).)
The State’s argument in that regard is directly contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent. See,
e.g., State v. Van Komen, 160 Idaho 534, 540 (2016).

7

In Van Komen, the Supreme Court was reviewing the district court’s decision to
relinquish jurisdiction. See id. It explained that, while there were legitimate bases upon which
the district court could have properly relinquished jurisdiction, “the court in its own words
relinquished jurisdiction solely because Defendant refused to waive his Fifth Amendment right.”
Id. (emphasis added). As such, the Supreme Court held, the district court’s actual words showed
it had reached its decision on an improper basis, and therefore, that actually-erroneous decision
had to be vacated. Id.; cf. State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 909 (2019) (reaffirming that the
question in terms of an illegal search is not what the officers might have done, but what the
officers actually did).
As the Court of Appeals succinctly put it while considering a similar issue: “When a trial
court raises a factor at sentencing, states that it considers that factor, and explains why it
considers that factor, we trust that the district court means what it says.” State v. Goetsch, 2014
WL 2619661, *6 (Ct. App. 2014) (vacating a sentence because the district court’s actual words
demonstrated it had considering an improper factor when it imposed that sentence).2 Therefore,
the State’s attempt to justify the district court’s decision based on what it wishes the district court
might have said, rather than on what the district court actually said, is improper and should be
rejected. The district court’s decision, as demonstrated by its actual words, was erroneous and
should be vacated for the reasons set forth in the Appellant’s Brief at pages 29-34.

2

Mr. Wilson recognizes that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent, and he does not
cite Goetsch as authority dictating a particular decision in this case. Rather, he merely references
it as a historical example of how a learned court has analyzed a similar issue. Compare Staff of
Idaho Real Estate Comm’n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting Bourgeois
v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) (“When this Court had cause to consider unpublished
opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant discussed the cases in his petition, we
found the presentation of the unpublished opinions as ‘quite appropriat[e].’ Likewise, we find
the hearing officer’s consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an
example, was appropriate.”).
8

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand his
case for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his motion for leniency be vacated
and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 21st day of January, 2021.
/s/ Elizabeth A. Allred
ELIZABETH A. ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of January, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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